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A Meaningless Ritual? The Due Process
Mandate for the Provision of
Competent Counsel in Arkansas
Capital Post-Conviction Proceedings
By MEGAN K. RosIcHAN*
LEDELL LEE'S LAWYER was drunk during Mr. Lee's state post-con-
viction hearing.' Under Arkansas law, during state habeas proceed-
ings to conduct a comprehensive review of his death sentence, Mr.
Lee was allegedly entitled to competent counsel. 2 Mr. Lee's lawyer
was, however, so intoxicated that counsel for the State of Arkansas
made the following request to the court:
Your Honor, I don't take this lightly, but with regard to [Mr. Lee's
counsel's] performance in Court today, I'm going to ask that the
Court require him to submit to a drug test. I don't think that he's,
he's not, he's just not with us. He's reintroduced the same items of
evidence over and over again. He's asking incoherent questions.
His speech is slurred. He stumbled in the Court Room. As a friend
of the Court, and I think it's our obligation to this Court and to
this Defendant that he have competent counsel here today, and I
don't-That's just my request of the Court, Your Honor.'
* Class of 2005; B.A., Saint Norbert College (2002). Editor-in-Chief, U.S.F. Law
Review, Volume 39. I am extremely grateful for Professor Steven Shatz's assistance, as well
as for his unwavering dedication to the Keta Taylor Colby Death Penalty Project. Thanks
also to Jenniffer Horan, Bruce Eddy, and Maggie Hill of the Arkansas Federal Public
Defender's Office. Most especially, I would like to thank my true friend, Arkansas partner-
in-crime, and, coincidentally, my editor, Robert Tadlock, for his collaboration and
patience-this Comment's half yours. For Riley.
1. See Lee v. Norris, 354 F.3d 846, 848 (8th Cir. 2004). Post-conviction proceedings,
sometimes called collateral review or state habeas corpus, occur after a state supreme court
or an intermediate appellate court, on direct appeal, affirms a sentence of death. If a state
provides for post-conviction review, a person sentenced to death must present all claims in
such a forum before proceedings to federal habeas corpus review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)
(2003).
2. See S.B. 392, 81st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1997) (as engrossed).
3. Lee v. Norris, 354 F.3d at 848 (alterations in original) (quoting court transcript).
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
The judge rejected this request and, not surprisingly, denied Mr.
Lee's petition for state post-conviction relief from his death sentence. 4
Timothy Kemp's appointed post-conviction counsel, despite
meeting Arkansas's qualifications for appointment, neither indepen-
dently reviewed Mr. Kemp's case nor conducted an independent in-
vestigation of his post-conviction claims.5 Rather, he delegated this
responsibility to Mr. Kemp's trial counsel, the very attorney whose in-
effectiveness at trial may have been a potential claim for relief.6 Mr.
Kemp's post-conviction counsel did not seek funding, available to him
under Arkansas law, for an investigator or mitigation specialist. 7 As a
result, Mr. Kemp's post-conviction counsel never discovered trial
counsel's deficient investigation of Mr. Kemp's background, which in-
cluded evidence that Mr. Kemp suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome,
brain damage, and had suffered severe abuse as a child.8 None of this
evidence was presented to the trial jury as mitigation on Mr. Kemp's
behalf.9 Such evidence, had Mr. Kemp's post-conviction attorney dis-
covered it, would have supported a claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel. Ultimately, another attorney, not appointed by the
court, prepared Mr. Kemp's post-conviction petition, which the ap-
pointed counsel only signed. 10 Prior to submitting a seven page post-
conviction petition, Mr. Kemp's post-conviction counsel met him only
once. During that meeting they never discussed which issues to raise
in the petition.11 The Arkansas Supreme Court denied Mr. Kemp's
petition for relief on all grounds. 12
Riley Noel's appointed state post-conviction counsel simply failed
to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in state post-
conviction proceedings on Mr. Noel's behalf. During Mr. Noel's trial
his attorney failed to couch objections in constitutional terms when
4. See Lee v. State, 38 S.W.3d 334 (Ark. 2001). Mr. Lee subsequently filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. After reviewing the transcripts of the state post-
conviction proceedings, the district court judge, on his own motion, raised the question of
whether Mr. Lee had been deprived of his due process rights and his state right to compe-
tent counsel. The district court is currently holding Mr. Lee's petition in abeyance pending
the outcome of Mr. Lee's attempts to litigate such claims in state court. See Lee v. Norris, 354
F.3d at 847.
5. Affidavit of Sam Heuer, app. 1, Petition for Habeas Corpus, Kemp v. Norris (E.D.
Ark. 2003) (No. 5-03-CV-00055).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Kemp v. State, 74 S.W.3d 224 (Ark. 2002).
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the prosecution, for example, repeatedly called Mr. Noel a "psycho-
path."'13 Such deficient representation may have given rise to a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Noel's appointed post-convic-
tion counsel, however, did not assert this as a basis for relief in his
state post-conviction proceedings. 14 As a result, when Mr. Noel's attor-
ney attempted to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
against Mr. Noel's trial counsel in federal habeas corpus proceedings,
the federal district court could not consider the claim because of Mr.
Noel's state post-conviction counsel's failure to raise the claim in the
prior state post-conviction proceedings.1 5 Riley Noel died by lethal in-
jection administered by the State of Arkansas on July 9, 2003 without
ever having a federal court adjudicate on the merits all of his possible
claims for relief from his death sentence.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Constitution
does not mandate the provision of counsel and thus effective assis-
tance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings. 16 Therefore, de-
fendants like Mr. Lee, Mr. Kemp, and Mr. Noel, regardless of the
quality of representation that they in fact receive in their state post-
conviction proceedings, are unable to raise claims of ineffective assis-
tance of post-conviction counsel. Many states, however, including Ar-
kansas, statutorily mandate the provision of competent counsel in
state post-conviction proceedings.1 7 This Comment argues, first, that
because the State of Arkansas statutorily mandates the appointment of
competent counsel for indigent persons under sentence of death in
its post-conviction proceedings, such counsel must provide effective
assistance. Second, this Comment concludes that those under sen-
tence of death in Arkansas who fail to receive the competent counsel
to which they are entitled under state law have been deprived of due
process of law under the Supreme Court's holding in Hicks v.
Oklahoma.i8 Those defendants, therefore, may raise a claim that their
due process rights have been violated when they received ineffective
assistance of state post-conviction counsel.
13. Noel v. Norris, 194 F. Supp. 2d 893, 922 (E.D. Ark. 2002), affd, 322 F.3d 500 (8th
Cir. 2003), and cert. denied, 539 U.S. 972 (2003).
14. Id. at 913-14.
15. Id. at 922-25.
16. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 757 (1991); Murray v. Giarratano, 492
U.S. 1, 10 (1989); Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982).
17. See Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to Effective Assistance of Capital Postcon-
viction Counsel: Constitutional Implications of Statutory Grants of Capital Counsel, 2003 Wis. L.
REv. 31, 63-64.
18. 447 U.S. 343 (1980).
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The result of ineffective assistance of state post-conviction coun-
sel and the seeming inability to raise such a claim is dire. Under the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"),' 9
state post-conviction proceedings are supposed to provide a compre-
hensive review of a defendant's death sentence. 20 Death-sentenced
persons such as Mr. Lee, Mr. Kemp, and Mr. Noel, however, whose
counsel failed to raise claims in state post-conviction proceedings, are
in almost all cases barred from raising such claims in federal habeas
corpus proceedings.21 The inability to do so is difficult to overstate
because federal courts are the forum in which a defendant stands the
greatest chance of garnering relief from a death sentence.22
Part I of this Comment presents background regarding the scope
of the right to counsel and the concomitant right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel as articulated by the United States Supreme Court.
Part II first examines state post-conviction proceedings in general and
the provision of counsel in such proceedings under Arkansas law. Part
II then discusses the impact of the denial of effective assistance of
counsel in Arkansas state post-conviction proceedings. Finally, Part III
argues that the mandatory provision of competent counsel in Arkan-
sas's post-conviction proceedings gives rise to an enforceable right to
the effective assistance of counsel. This right is such that when a
death-sentenced person does not receive the effective assistance that
he is entitled to receive under state law, he has been deprived of due
process of law under the Supreme Court's decision in Hicks. Ulti-
mately, this Comment concludes that those under sentence of death
in Arkansas who receive ineffective assistance of post-conviction coun-
sel, appointed pursuant to Arkansas law, may raise claims in both state
and federal court that the State's failure to provide them with their
statutorily entitled effective assistance amounts to a deprivation of due
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 23
19. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2262-2266 (2000).
20. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. tit. 9, ch. 91, subch. 2, references & annots. (Michie
2003).
21. A federal district court does not have jurisdiction to review claims in federal
habeas corpus proceedings that have not been raised in state appellate or state post-convic-
tion proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2003); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
22. See JAMES LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES,
1973-1995, at 6 (2000), available at http://justice.policy.net/jpreport/finreport/finrep.
pdf (last accessed Apr. 1, 2004); see also McConville, supra note 17, at 33.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
[Vol. 38
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL
I. The Constitutional Right to Counsel and Effective
Assistance of Counsel
The evolution of the Supreme Court's right to counsel jurispru-
dence did not begin in earnest until 1932. In Powell v. Alabama,24 a
group of young African-Americans were convicted of rape and sen-
tenced to death in a lynch-mob atmosphere without the aid of ap-
pointed counsel. 2 5 In Powell, discussing the importance of the right to
counsel, the Supreme Court stated:
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ coun-
sel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because
of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty
of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as
a necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not
discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such circum-
stances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation
and trial of the case. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the
fundamental postulate... "that there are certain immutable prin-
ciples of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government
which no member of the Union may disregard."
26
The Court's articulation of the right to counsel and the funda-
mental importance of receiving not just counsel, but the effective as-
sistance of counsel, continued to expand in the years following Powell.
Despite the expansion of this right, however, the Supreme Court has
thus far refused to hold that those under sentence of death are enti-
tled to counsel, and thus effective assistance of counsel, in state post-
conviction proceedings.
Under the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence, whether a
criminal defendant has a right to counsel and a right to the effective
assistance of counsel is dependent upon the posture of the defen-
dant's case. This is true whether the crime at issue is a capital or non-
capital crime. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution guarantee indigent criminal defendants in both
state and federal courts a right to the assistance of counsel at all criti-
cal stages of trial proceedings.2 7 The Supreme Court, in fact, has held
that representation by counsel is a right that is "fundamental and es-
sential to fair trials." 28 The right to counsel in trial proceedings under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments also implies a concomitant
24. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
25. Id. at 49-52.
26. Id. at 71-72 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898)).
27. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963).
28. Id. at 344.
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right to the effective assistance of counsel, 29 a right that attaches re-
gardless of whether counsel is retained or appointed.30 The right to
effective assistance of counsel derives from the fact that "the Constitu-
tion cannot tolerate trials in which counsel, though present in name,
is unable to assist the defendant to obtain a fair decision on the
merits."31
The Fourteenth Amendment also protects a defendant's right to
counsel in direct appellate proceedings. While there is no constitu-
tional right to a direct appeal, 32 in Douglas v. CaliforniaM the Supreme
Court held that when a state chooses to provide criminal defendants
with a direct appeal the state must provide indigents with counsel for
that appeal. 34 The rationale for the constitutionally-based require-
ment of appointed counsel for direct appeals is that the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantees of Due Process and Equal Protection are of-
fended where the indigent "has only the right to a meaningless ritual,
while the rich man has a meaningful appeal."35 Further, the Supreme
Court has held that the right to counsel in a state-provided direct ap-
peal implies a concomitant right to the effective assistance of counsel
for such an appeal.3 6
However, neither the Sixth nor the Fourteenth Amendment af-
fords a defendant the right to counsel in discretionary proceedings
including, inter alia, state post-conviction and habeas corpus review.
State post-conviction proceedings, which are the primary focus of this
Comment, are discretionary proceedings that occur after a state su-
preme court or intermediate appellate court on direct review affirms a
sentence. Generally, post-conviction proceedings represent an oppor-
tunity for a convicted person to comprehensively challenge the consti-
tutionality of his confinement. The Supreme Court has thus far
refused to extend the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to
counsel and effective assistance of counsel to post-conviction proceed-
29. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,
771 n.14 (1970).
30. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
31. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 395 (1985).
32. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) ("[i]t is wholly within the discre-
tion of the state" to grant an appeal as of right).
33. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
34. Id. at 355-56.
35. Id. at 358.
36. See Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397 ("[T]he promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has
a right to counsel at trial-would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to
the effective assistance of counsel.").
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ings for persons under sentence of death or to any convicted persons
for that matter.
The Court first considered the provision of counsel in discretion-
ary proceedings in Ross v. Moffitt.37 The question presented in Ross was
whether Douglas v. California's holding requiring appointed counsel
for indigent defendants on direct appeal should be extended to re-
quire the appointment of counsel for discretionary state appeals and
applications for review to the United States Supreme Court.38 Ross was
a consolidation of a defendant's two North Carolina forgery convic-
tions. 39 In the first case, Moffit's conviction was affirmed on direct
appeal and his attorney for that appeal requested that he be ap-
pointed to represent Moffitt in discretionary state proceedings. 40 The
trial court denied this request on the ground that the State was not
required to furnish counsel for discretionary review.41 In the second
case, respondent was represented in his discretionary proceedings by
the public defender that had been appointed for his trial and direct
appeal. The North Carolina Supreme Court denied certiorari in his
post-conviction review, and he requested that counsel be appointed to
assist in preparing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court.42 This request was denied.43
The Supreme Court held in Ross that neither Due Process nor
Equal Protection requires states to appoint counsel to represent indi-
gent defendants for discretionary state proceedings or for applications
for review to the United States Supreme Court.44 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the Court, reasoned that differences between the
trial and discretionary appellate stages of criminal proceedings justi-
fied this holding, stating that in discretionary review "it is ordinarily
the defendant, rather than the State, who initiates the appellate pro-
cess, seeking not to fend off the efforts of the State's prosecut[ion]
but rather to overturn a finding of guilt .... -45The Court stated that
as long as the State does not discriminate against indigents, the Four-
teenth Amendment does not require states to implement a system of
37. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
38. Id. at 602-03.
39. Id. at 603.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 604.
43. Id. at 610.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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appointed counsel for discretionary review. 46 The Court reasoned that
because the State provided Moffitt with counsel for his trial and for his
direct appeal, it could not be said "that a defendant in (Moffitt's] cir-
cumstances is denied meaningful access to the North Carolina Su-
preme Court simply because the State does not appoint counsel to aid
him in seeking review to that court. '47
Following Ross, in a short per curiam opinion, Wainwright v.
Torna,48 the Court held that because a convicted person does not have
a constitutional right to counsel to pursue discretionary review, a de-
fendant may not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel in
discretionary state appellate proceedings. 49 In Wainwright, respon-
dent's retained counsel failed to make a timely post-conviction appli-
cation for certiorari contesting his felony convictions to the Florida
Supreme Court.50 As a result, the Florida Supreme Court dismissed
the petition.51 The Supreme Court relied entirely on Ross for the pro-
position that "[s] ince respondent has no constitutional right to coun-
sel, he could not be deprived of the effective assistance of
counsel .... -52
Three later cases expanded the holding of Wainwright. In Penn-
sylvania v. Finley,53 the Court addressed whether the procedures man-
dated for the withdrawal of counsel from a non-capital direct appeal
were required for the withdrawal of state post-conviction counsel pro-
vided by a state statute.5 4 In Finley, the respondent was convicted of
second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.55 She lost
on direct appeal and then sought relief under the Pennsylvania Post
Conviction Hearing Act, proceeding pro se.56 Finley was denied post-
conviction relief in the trial court, but the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reversed, holding that she was entitled, under state law, to ap-
46. Id. at 618-19.
47. Id. at 615.
48. 455 U.S. 586 (1982) (per curium).
49. Id. at 587-88.
50. Id. at 586.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 587-88.
53. 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
54. Id. at 553-54 (citing Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (holding that
when an attorney seeks to withdraw as appellate counsel on direct appeal, believing an
appeal to be wholly frivolous, the attorney must follow certain procedural protections, in-
cluding filing a brief with the Court and his client setting forth anything in the record that
might arguably support an appeal)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 553.
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pointed counsel for her post-conviction proceedings. 57 Finley was ap-
pointed counsel on remand, but this counsel withdrew when he
concluded that Finley had no arguable basis for seeking post-convic-
tion relief.58 The trial court conducted an independent review of the
record and agreed, dismissing respondent's petition. 59 Finley ac-
quired new counsel and appealed to the superior court, contending
that the conduct of her counsel in post-conviction proceedings vio-
lated her constitutional rights as established by Anders.60 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court found that post-conviction counsel's failure to
follow Anders had, in fact, violated Finley's constitutional rights.
61
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that
because there is no underlying constitutional mandate of counsel in
post-conviction proceedings, there is no constitutional right to the
protections required by Anders.62 The Anders holding, according to the
Court, was based upon "the underlying constitutional right to ap-
pointed counsel" 63 guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Finley's
right to counsel, however, was based on a state statute, and the Court
stated, "[I] t is the source of that right to a lawyer's assistance, com-
bined with the nature of the proceeding, that controls the constitu-
tional question. ' 64 Further, the Court stated that because the
Pennsylvania courts found that the actions of counsel satisfied Penn-
sylvania law,65 "respondent ha[d] received exactly that which she is
entitled to receive under state law," and therefore she could not claim
a "deprivation without due process. 66
57. See Commonwealth v. Finley, 440 A.2d 1183, 1184 (Pa. 1981).
58. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 553 (1987).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 553-54.
61. See Commonwealth v. Finley, 479 A.2d 568, 571 (Pa. 1984).
62. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. at 555-57.
63. Id. at 554.
64. Id. at 556.
65. The dissent took strong issue with this finding, contending that the Pennsylvania
post-conviction law, in fact, required effective assistance of counsel. See Pennsylvania v. Fin-
ley, 481 U.S. at 566-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Just one year later the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held that its state post-conviction statute requiring the appointment of
counsel in post-conviction proceedings necessarily gave rise to a right that such counsel be
effective. See Commonwealth v. Albert, 561 A.2d 736, 738 (Pa. 1989) ("It is axiomatic that
the right to counsel includes the concomitant right to effective assistance of counsel. In-
deed, the right to counsel is meaningless if effective assistance is not guaranteed.") (inter-
nal citations omitted).
66. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. at 558.
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The Court considered the applicability of Finley to capital cases in
Murray v. Giarratano.6 7 In Murray, a group of indigent death row in-
mates brought a civil rights class action in the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia against officials of the Commonwealth of Virginia, alleging that
the United States Constitution required that they be appointed coun-
sel for the purposes of pursuing state post-conviction relief.68 The in-
mates' claim was principally based upon Bounds v. Smith,69 wherein
the Court held on due process and equal protection grounds that pris-
oners' "right of access" to the courts required a state to furnish ade-
quate access to law libraries. 70 The district court agreed, finding that
the special time limitations placed on death row inmates and the com-
plexity of their cases mandated that the dictates of Bounds could not
be fulfilled unless counsel was provided to indigent death row inmates
to assist in preparing post-conviction petitions.71 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, 72 but subsequently
reheard the case en banc and affirmed the district court.73
On review, the Supreme Court stated that neither the Eighth
Amendment nor due process requires that states appoint counsel for
indigent death row inmates seeking post-conviction relief.7 4 The
Court held that Finley, and not Bounds, was the controlling precedent
and that Finley was applicable to both capital and non-capital cases. 75
The Court rejected Bounds's applicability to a right to counsel analysis,
stating that to allow a district court to partially overrule Finley in a
particular state based on its factual findings "regarding matters such
as the perceived difficulty of capital sentencing law and the general
psychology of death row inmates" would be to sway from the Court's
"categorical holdings as to what the Constitution requires with respect
to a particular stage of a criminal proceeding in general." 76
Coleman v. Thompson 77 is the most recent case in which the Su-
preme Court considered the right to counsel in post-conviction pro-
67. 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
68. Id. at 3. Under Virginia law at the time there was no state statute that required the
appointment of counsel prior to the filing of a petition for post-conviction relief. See id. at
5.
69. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
70. Id. at 828.
71. See Giarratano v. Murray, 668 F. Supp. 511, 513 (E.D. Va. 1986).
72. See Giarratano v. Murray, 836 F.2d 1421, 1423 (4th Cir. 1988).
73. See Murray v. Giarratano, 847 F.2d 1118, 1121 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
74. Murray v. Giarratano, 494 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).
75. Id. at 10-11.
76. Id. at 12.
77. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
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ceedings. In Coleman, the Court held that, because there is no
constitutional right to appointed counsel in state post-conviction pro-
ceedings, an attorney error that results in a procedural default of a
defendant's claims in state habeas corpus proceedings cannot consti-
tute "cause '78 to excuse the default in federal habeas corpus. 79 Thus,
under current Supreme Court precedent, because there is no consti-
tutional right to effective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction
proceedings, claims that are not raised in state post-conviction pro-
ceedings may not be raised in federal habeas corpus proceedings on
the basis of an allegation that the ineffective assistance of post-convic-
tion counsel was cause for the failure to raise the claim in state court.
On its face, this means that ineffective assistance of counsel received
by a death-sentenced person in state post-conviction proceedings re-
sults in the defendant losing, for all intents and purposes, those claims
that were not raised in state post-conviction proceedings.
II. Post-Conviction Proceedings in Arkansas and the Problem
of Ineffective Assistance of Post-Conviction Counsel
While under the United States Constitution the State of Arkansas
has no duty to provide counsel to death-sentenced persons in its post-
conviction proceedings, Arkansas, in an attempt to comply with the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, mandates the
provision of "competent counsel" in its post-conviction proceedings. 80
However, simply providing for the mandatory provision of competent
counsel and a capital defendant receiving effective assistance from such
counsel in their post-conviction proceedings is not one in the same.
For a person under sentence of death, this difference between simply
receiving counsel and actually receiving the effective assistance of
counsel has deadly consequences.
78. The failure to raise a claim during state direct appellate review or state post-con-
viction review is called a "procedural default." A federal district court may not rule on
claims in habeas corpus proceedings that have been procedurally defaulted. In order to
overcome a procedural default and be able to raise a defaulted claim in federal habeas
corpus proceedings, the appellant must show both "cause" for the default and resulting
"prejudice." See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2000); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977).
79. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 757.
80. See ARK. CODE ANN. tit. 9, ch. 91, subch. 2, references & annots. (Michie 2003)
(stating that the intent of the act is to comply with the AEDPA).
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A. The Provision of Counsel in Post-Conviction Proceedings in
Arkansas
Following a capital conviction, Arkansas, like many death penalty
states, provides those under sentence of death with an automatic di-
rect appeal.8 1 If the Arkansas Supreme Court on direct review affirms
the death sentence, a defendant is then entitled to state post-convic-
tion review. The system of post-conviction review in Arkansas is set
forth in Rule 37.1 et seq. of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure
("Rule 37").82 The purpose of Rule 37 proceedings in Arkansas is to
determine whether an accused's constitutional or statutory rights were
violated in the underlying trial. 83 By both statute and judicial rule,
except in rare circumstances, a petitioner is allowed to file only one
Rule 37 petition and must set forth in that petition all possible
grounds for relief.84 Rule 37 petitions are filed at the circuit court
level and may be appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court.85 When a
petition for post-conviction relief is denied, federal habeas corpus is
then the last available forum in which a defendant may seek relief.
States, including Arkansas, have been motivated to provide coun-
sel in their post-conviction proceedings primarily so that they can
comply with AEDPA. 86 If a state can show compliance with AEDPA, 8 7
principally by showing that the state provides for the mandatory ap-
pointment and compensation of competent counsel in its post-convic-
tion proceedings, the state receives the "benefit" of streamlined
81. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-91-101(a) (Michie 2003).
82. ARK. R. CiJM. P. 37.1-37.5 (Michie 2003).
83. Cigainero v. State, 906 S.W.2d 282, 283-284 (Ark. 1995); see also Bohanan v. State,
985 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Ark. 1999); ARK. R. CpRM. P. 37.1(a)-(d).
84. See ARK. R. CrIM. P. 37.2(b); Williams v. State, 619 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Ark. 1981).
Prior to Williams, the Arkansas Supreme Court allowed, byjudicial rule, the filing of multi-
ple Rule 37 petitions.
85. See ARK. R. CIM. P. 37.2(c).
86. Arkansas explicitly states in its post-conviction statute that the purpose of the stat-
ute is to comply with the requirements of AEDPA. See ARK. CODE ANN. tit. 9, ch. 91, subch.
2, references & annots. (Michie 2003).
87. Compliance with AEDPA is generally termed "opting in." A state complies with
the requirements of AEDPA if the state establishes by statute, by rule of its court of last
resort, or by another agency authorized by state law, a mechanism for the appointment,
compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel in
state post-conviction proceedings brought by indigent capital defendants who have had
their sentences affirmed on direct appeal by the state's court of last resort or who have
otherwise had their sentences become final for state law purposes. The state must also
provide for competency standards of appointed state post-conviction counsel. See 28 U.S.C.
2261 (b) (2000). See generally Burke W. Kappler, Small Favors: Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act, the States, and the Right to Counsel, 90J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL,
OGY 467 (2000). The issue of Arkansas's opt-in status has not been litigated.
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federal habeas corpus procedures applicable to the state's death-sen-
tenced persons.
s8
Until 1997, Arkansas did not provide persons under sentence of
death with counsel for Rule 37 proceedings. 8 9 In 1997, however, the
Legislature amended Rule 37 by enacting the Arkansas Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1997, which added Rule 37.5, entitled "Special
Rule for Persons Under Sentence of Death." 90 This provision provides
that within twenty-one days after the Arkansas Supreme Court affirms
a sentence of death on direct review, the circuit court that imposed
the sentence of death, "shall inform the person of the existence of
possible relief under this rule and shall determine whether the person
desires the appointment of an attorney" to represent him in Rule 37
proceedings. 91 Waiver of the right to an attorney for post-conviction
relief must be made in open court, on the record, and the circuit
court must issue written findings regarding waiver of the right.92
Rule 37 sets forth specific qualifications that counsel must meet
and provides that the circuit court must make a written order con-
cerning the appointment of counsel. 93 Specifically, under Rule
37.5(c) (1) an attorney must meet the following standards:
(A) Within ten (10) years immediately preceding the appoint-
ment, the attorney shall have:
(i) represented a petitioner under sentence of death in a
state or federal post-conviction proceeding; or
(ii) actively participated as defense counsel in at least five (5)
felony jury trials tried to completion, including one trial
in which the death penalty was sought; and
(B) Within ten (10) years immediately preceding the appoint-
ment, the attorney shall have:
(i) represented a petitioner in at least three state or federal
post-conviction proceedings, one of which proceeded to
an evidentiary hearing and all of which involved a convic-
tion of a violent felony, including one conviction of mur-
der; or
88. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2262-66. Capital defendants in opt-in states are subject to a six
month statute of limitations for the filing of federal habeas corpus petitions rather than
the standard one year statute of limitations. This statute of limitations also begins to run as
soon as the defendant's conviction is affirmed on direct review by the state supreme court
rather than upon the completion of Supreme Court certiorari review, as is the case in non-
opt-in states. See id.; see also McConville, supra note 17, at 62-63.
89. See generally Porter v. State, 2 S.W.3d 73, 74 (Ark. 1999) (discussing how the enact-
ment of Rule 37.5 has changed post-conviction review in Arkansas).
90. ARK. R. CuM. P. 37.5 (Michie 2003).
91. Id. at 37.5(b).
92. Id. at 37.5(b) (2).
93. Id. at 37.5(b) (2) & (c).
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(ii) represented a defendant in at least three (3) appeals in-
volving a conviction of a violent felony, including one
conviction of murder, and represented a petitioner in at
least one evidentiary hearing in a state or federal post-
conviction proceedings; and
(C) The attorney shall have been actively engaged in the practice
of law for at least three (3) years; and
(D) Within two (2) years immediately preceding the appointment,
the attorney shall have completed at least six (6) hours of con-
tinuing legal education or other professional training in the
representation of persons in capital trial, capital appellate, or
capital post-conviction proceedings.9 4
An attorney may also be appointed by the court that does not
meet these qualifications "if the circuit court determines that the at-
torney is clearly qualified because of his unique training, experience,
and background to represent a person under sentence of death in
post-conviction proceedings," provided that the court makes a written
finding to that effect.9 5
B. Failures of Competence: The Problem of Ineffective Assistance
in Arkansas Post-Conviction Proceedings
The legislative comments that accompanied the enactment of
Rule 37.5 state that the purpose of the rule was to provide "a mecha-
nism for the appointment, compensation, and reimbursement of com-
petent counsel for all indigent capital defendants in state post-
conviction proceedings." 96 The desire to appoint competent counsel
by enforcing qualification requirements does not, however, guarantee
actual effective assistance by such counsel once appointed. State post-
conviction proceedings in Arkansas represent a comprehensive op-
portunity for a person under sentence of death to challenge the con-
stitutionality of his sentence. 9 7 This means that post-conviction
counsel plays a fundamental role in reviewing the performance of trial
counsel for possible claims of ineffectiveness, reviewing the trial re-
cord for potential constitutional claims, such as jury and prosecutorial
misconduct, and reviewing the performance of direct appellate coun-
sel. Such a review often involves a complete reexamination of not only
94. Id. at 37.5(c)(1).
95. Id. at 37.5(c) (4). It is impossible to know with any certainty whether most counsel
appointed under Rule 37 meet the competency requirements of Rule 37.5(c) (1) or the
special requirements of Rule 37.5(c) (4) because Arkansas does not keep or report such
statistics.
96. ARK. CODE ANN. tit. 9, ch. 91, subch. 2, references & annots. (Michie 2003).
97. Cigainero v. State, 906 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Ark. 1995); Echols v. State, 42 S.W.3d
467, 470 (Ark. 2001).
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the trial record but also of the alleged crime and the resulting investi-
gation.98 The Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized the impor-
tance of post-conviction proceedings, stating "[p]ostconviction
proceedings under Rule 37 are intended to avoid persons being un-
justly imprisoned. This rule enables the courts to correct a manifest
injustice . . . . 'Rule 37 is ... designed to prevent wrongful incarcera-
tion under a sentence so flawed as to be void."' 99
Effective representation of death-sentenced persons in Arkansas's
Rule 37 proceedings is especially important because, almost without
exception, a person is entitled to only one Rule 37 petition. 10 The
petition must also conform to stringent format and filing require-
ments in order to even be considered. 101 Further, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court has specifically held that the other forms of collateral
relief available in the State, a writ of error coram nobis'0 2 and a peti-
tion for state habeas corpus, may not be used to address issues that
properly should have been raised in Rule 37 proceedings. 10 3 The re-
sult of this system is that a death-sentenced person, such as Mr. Lee,
Mr. Kemp, or Mr. Noel, whose attorney fails to raise a claim, conduct
an investigation, or even follow procedural guidelines when filing a
Rule 37 petition entirely loses the opportunity to have his constitu-
tional claims evaluated in state court.
The result goes much further, however, because state post-convic-
tion proceedings play a fundamentally important role in later federal
habeas corpus review. With limited exception, all claims for relief
from a death sentence must be raised in state post-conviction proceed-
ings and decided on the merits in order to be reviewed in subsequent
98. See Letty S. Di Giulio, Dying for the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in State Post-
Conviction Proceedings: State Statutes & Due Process in Capital Cases, 9 B.U. PuB. I .L.J. 109,
114-15 (1999).
99. Bohanan v. State, 985 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Ark. 1999) (citations omitted).
100. See Williams v. State, 619 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Ark. 1981) (holding that subsequent
petitions under Rule 37 will only be considered if the original petition was specifically
denied without prejudice to refile).
101. See O'Brien v. State, 3 S.W.3d 332, 333 (Ark. 1999) (denying an appellant's re-
quest to file a second Rule 37 after original petition was denied on the basis of untimeli-
ness). Rule 37 petitions must be ten pages in length unless amendments are permitted by
the court and must be filed within ninety days of the appointment of post-conviction coun-
sel. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1(e), 37.5(e) (Michie 2003).
102. A writ of error coram nobis is "[a] procedural tool whose purpose is to correct
errors of fact only, and its function is to bring before the court rendering the judgment
matters of fact which, if known at time judgment was rendered, would have prevented its
rendition." BLAcK's LAw DIC-rIONARY 337 (6th ed. 1990).
103. See Renshaw v. Norris, 989 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Ark. 1999); Williams v. Langston, 688
S.W.2d 285, 286 (Ark. 1985).
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federal habeas corpus proceedings. 10 4 This is significant, as it is esti-
mated that forty percent of all death penalty cases were reversed in
federal habeas corpus proceedings from 1973 through 1995.105 Thus,
a death-sentenced person who receives ineffective assistance in state
post-conviction proceedings loses not only the ability to have his con-
stitutional claims addressed in the first available state forum, but also
in federal court, where he stands the greatest chance of garnering
relief. Given the known rate of reversal and error in death penalty
cases that actually are evaluated by appellate and post-conviction
courts on the merits, it is highly likely that many death-sentenced per-
sons in Arkansas, such as Mr. Noel, are executed without even having
the opportunity to present valid claims for relief as a result of ineffec-
tive post-conviction counsel.
The rate at which death sentences are reversed, in both the
United States as a whole and Arkansas, illustrates the fundamental im-
portance of comprehensive appellate review. A recent statistical exam-
ination of the death penalty revealed that from 1973 to 1995 there was
an overall error rate of seventy percent in Arkansas death penalty
cases. 10 6 The rate of error found in federal habeas corpus review of
Arkansas death penalty cases was forty-eight percent, the highest of
any state in the Eighth Circuit.107 Nationally, during the twenty-three
years of the study, more than two out of every three death penalty
cases that were judicially reviewed were found to be seriously
flawed. 108 Importantly, however, these numbers are likely an underes-
timation of the true level of error in death penalty cases because these
statistics only include those claims that were actually raised and de-
cided on the merits by courts on review. They do not account for
those claims, such as Mr. Lee's, Mr. Kemp's, and Mr. Noel's, that were
not raised because of ineffective post-conviction counsel.
m. The Due Process Mandate for Effective Assistance of
Post-Conviction Counsel in Arkansas
The Supreme Court has clearly found that the Sixth Amendment
does not require a state to provide counsel in post-conviction proceed-
104. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2000); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
105. LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 35.
106. Id. at 66 tbl.7. The study, conducted as a statistical consolidation of the over 5,760
capital sentences and 4,578 appeals in states imposing the death penalty from 1973-1995,
defines overall error rate as the proportion of fully reviewed capital judgments that were
overturned at one of the three stages of review due to serious error. Id. at 2.
107. Id. at 69 tbl.8.
108. Id. at 2.
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ings. 10 9 Thus, a defendant is not constitutionally entitled to effective
assistance of counsel in such proceedings.1 I1 0 This would seem to fore-
close any argument that death-sentenced defendants in Arkansas are
entitled to raise claims of ineffective assistance of state post-conviction
counsel. The Supreme Court has held, however, that a state-created
statutory right may also create a liberty or property interest that is sub-
ject to the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.1 1 Thus, because the State of Arkansas grants death-sentenced
defendants an unequivocal entitlement to competent counsel in post-
conviction proceedings, the Federal Constitution's Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause,' 12 as interpreted principally by the
Supreme Court's holding in Hicks v. Oklahoma, mandates that death-
sentenced persons who receive ineffective assistance of counsel in
their state post-conviction hearings have been deprived of a due pro-
cess right and may raise such a claim in state or federal court.
A. State-Created Liberty Interests Protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause
Until the last quarter of the twentieth century the Supreme Court
narrowly defined those liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 113 Recently however, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held in many contexts that state statutes may
create liberty interests that are above and beyond those granted to
citizens substantively by the United States Constitution.' 14 Once a
state has granted such an interest, due process protections attach to
that interest and the state-created right "may not be arbitrarily abro-
gated."'" 5 Further, the Court has stated that "[a] state-created right
109. See Murray v. Giarratano, 494 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).
110. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 772 (1991).
111. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore,'531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291,
303 (1982); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 463-64 (1981); Hicks v.
Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1980); Bd. of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18
(1956).
112. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1.
113. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-68 (1970) (abrogating the Court's
traditional distinction between "rights" and "privileges" and finding that where receipt of
welfare aid was a matter of statutory entitlement that such aid is a property right subject to
due process protections and not merely a privilege granted by state law); see generally ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 534-36 (Aspen Law & Bus., 2d ed. 2002).
114. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980).
115. Id. at 488-89 (citations omitted).
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can, in some circumstances, beget yet other rights to procedures es-
sential to the realization of the parent right."' 1 6
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth117 was the Supreme Court's
first clear articulation of how a state may create liberty interests pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause. Roth arose from a suit brought by a
non-tenured college professor whose fixed one-year faculty term en-
ded without him being rehired."" The professor brought suit alleg-
ing, inter alia, that he had a liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause in continued employment.' 19 The Supreme Court held
that because the state law in question left the decision to "rehire a
nontenured teacher for another year to the unfettered discretion of
university officials,"'120 the plaintiff did not have a liberty interest in
continued employment protected by the Due Process Clause.' 21 In the
course of its analysis, however, the Court defined those liberty inter-
ests protected by the Due Process Clause to include not only rights
specifically granted by the Constitution but also those rights that are
not enumerated in the Constitution and arise from independent
sources, such as state law. 122
In a number of cases following Roth, the Court held that specific
state laws created liberty interests protected by the Due Process
Clause. For example, while there is no constitutional right to pa-
role,1 23 in Morrissey v. Brewer,124 the Court found a liberty interest pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause in remaining free on parole once a
state created a right to parole. 125 The Court reasoned that once pa-
role is unequivocally granted by a state statute "the liberty of a pa-
rolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of
unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the
parolee . . . . [T] he liberty is valuable and must be seen within the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 26 Likewise, the Court
held in Vitek v. Jones127 that a prisoner has a protected liberty interest
in not being involuntarily transferred to a mental hospital when a
116. Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 463 (1981) (citations omitted).
117. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
118. Id. at 566.
119. Id. at 568.
120. Id. at 567.
121. Id. at 572.
122. Id. at 572-77.
123. See Greenholtz v. Neb. Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).
124. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
125. Id. at 472.
126. Id. at 482.
127. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
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state law mandates that only those determined to suffer from mental
diseases will be transferred to mental hospitals. 128
Hicks v. Oklahoma represents the clearest mandate and descrip-
tion by the Supreme Court of the due process requirements of state
statute-created liberty interests. In Hicks, the defendant, Flynn Hicks,
was tried before a jury in an Oklahoma state court for a single count
of unlawful distribution of heroin. 129 Hicks twice before had been
convicted of felony offenses within the preceding ten years. 130 There-
fore, under Oklahoma's habitual offender statute, the members of
Hicks's jury were instructed that if they found Hicks guilty, they "'shall
assess [the] punishment at forty (40) years imprisonment.' 1 3 1 Upon
returning a verdict of guilty the jury imposed the mandatory forty-year
prison term as instructed by the trial court.132
Following Hicks's conviction, however, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals in Thigpen v. State133 declared Oklahoma's habitual
offender statute, under which Hicks had been sentenced, unconstitu-
tional under the Oklahoma State Constitution.13 4 Hicks thereafter ap-
pealed his own sentence arguing that Thigpen mandated re-
sentencing. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals on review ac-
knowledged that the habitual offender statute was unconstitutional,
but nonetheless refused to reverse Hicks' sentence. 13 5 The court rea-
soned that the unconstitutional statute did not prejudice Hicks be-
cause his sentence of forty years was still within the range of
punishment that the jury could have imposed regardless of the habit-
ual offender statute.' 3 6 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.137
The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that under
Oklahoma law "a convicted defendant is entitled to have his punish-
ment fixed by the jury.' 3 8 According to the Court, if the jury in
Hicks's case had been properly instructed, given the unconstitutional-
128. Id. at 488-90 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Greenholtz, 442 U.S.
1 (1979)).
129. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 344 (1980).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 344-45 (alterations in original).
132. Id. at 345.
133. 571 P.2d 467 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
134. Id. at 471.
135. See Hicks, 447 U.S. at 345 (citing Hicks v. State, 583 P.2d 1117 (Okla. Crim. App.
1979)).
136. Id.
137. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 444 U.S. 963 (1979) (granting certiorari).
138. Hicks, 447 U.S. at 345.
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ity of the habitual sentencing statute, they would have been instructed
under Oklahoma law to impose any sentence not less than ten
years.' 39 The Court reasoned that, "i]t is therefore, wholly incorrect
to say that the petitioner could not have been prejudiced by the in-
struction requiring the jury to impose a 40-year prison sentence.' 140
The Court found that the failure of the State to afford Hicks his
state-created right to have the jury affix his sentence was not simply a
violation of state law. Rather, because of the unequivocal liberty inter-
est created by the state statute, Oklahoma violated Hicks's rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court
reasoned:
It is argued that all that is involved in this case is the denial of a
procedural right of exclusively state concern. Where, however, a
State has provided for the imposition of criminal punishment in
the discretion of the trial jury, it is not correct to say that the defen-
dant's interest in the exercise of that discretion is merely a matter
of state procedural law. The defendant in such a case has a substan-
tial and legitimate expectation that he will be deprived of his lib-
erty only to the extent determined by the jury in the exercise of its
statutory discretion, and that liberty interest is one that the Four-
teenth Amendment preserves against arbitrary deprivation by the
State. In this case Oklahoma denied the petitioner the jury sentence to
which he was entitled under state law .... Such an arbitrary disregard of
the petitioner's right to liberty is a denial of due process of law.14 1
Under Hicks, therefore, it is clear that a state statute does not
merely create a state right subject only to the protections and proce-
dures of state law. 142 Rather, a state statute that creates an entitlement
gives rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. A person who has not received that
which he was guaranteed to receive under state law, such as punish-
ment set by a jury as in Hicks, has been denied due process of law by
139. Id. at 346.
140. Id.
141. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (citing Greenholtz, 442 U.S. 1; Vitek, 445
U.S. 480; Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471).
142. The Eighth Circuit, Arkansas's circuit, has indicated that it will apply Hicks in a
way that essentially limits it to its facts, stating that Hicks created only a very narrow rule
that "some aspects of the sentencing process, created by state law, are so fundamental that
the state must adhere to them in order to impose a valid sentence." Chambers v. Bowersox,
157 F.3d 560, 565 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Lannert v. Jones, 321 F.3d 747, 751-52 (8th Cir.
2003); Carter v. Bowersox, 265 F.3d 705, 714-15 (8th Cir. 2001). However, limiting Hicks's
application in this way is incorrect for at least two reasons. First, there is nothing is the
Court's language or reasoning in Hicks from which it may be inferred that the Court was
limiting Hicks only to its facts. Second, the precedents relied on by the Court to reach the
holding in Hicks, particularly Morrissey and Vitek, clearly support the broader principle that
a state-entitlement is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.
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the state. Thus, as the section that follows concludes, under Hicks a
death-sentenced person in Arkansas who does not receive the compe-
tent counsel that he was entitled to receive under Rule 37 has not
merely been deprived of a state right, but rather has also been de-
prived of a federal constitutionally-protected liberty interest and
therefore due process of law.
B. Applying the Legacy of Hicks to Arkansas's Rule 37.5
Neither the Arkansas nor the federal courts have been asked to
address the issue of whether or not Arkansas's mandatory provision of
competent counsel to death-sentenced persons in state post-convic-
tion proceedings creates a liberty interest in the effective assistance of
counsel protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 143 However, when the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
regarding this area of law, particularly the Court's holding in Hicks, is
applied to Arkansas' statute and its cases describing Rule 37, the ines-
capable conclusion is that the State's provision of counsel to death-
sentenced persons is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause under Hicks. Further, this protected liberty interest is not sim-
ply an interest in receiving counsel, but rather is an interest in receiv-
ing effective assistance of such counsel.
1. Arkansas's Rule 37.5: A Due Process Entitlement to Competent
Counsel
The Arkansas statute providing for the appointment of counsel in
state post-conviction proceedings for persons sentenced to death falls
squarely within the Supreme Court precedents, principally Hicks,
which hold that a state law entitlement can create a liberty interest.
Like the defendant in Hicks who was entitled under state law to receive
a sentence determined by a jury, a death-sentenced person under Ar-
kansas law is entitled to receive competent counsel for his post-convic-
tion proceedings pursuant to Rule 37. First and foremost, the
preamble to the statute could not be more clear as to the purpose of
the Act: "to provide for the appointment and compensation of compe-
143. Counsel for Ledell Lee has asserted this claim in Mr. Lee's federal habeas corpus
proceedings. See Lee v. Norris, 354 F.3d 846, 847 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming a federal dis-
trict court order staying Mr. Lee's habeas corpus petition and holding it in abeyance pend-
ing the outcome of further proceedings in state court so that Mr. Lee may raise claims of
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel). The Eighth Circuit specifically passed on
considering the merits of such a claim pending further litigation. Id.
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tent counsel in state post-conviction proceedings.' 1 44 Second, the lan-
guage of the statute itself regarding the provision of counsel is in all
senses mandatory. For example, the statute provides, "If a capital con-
viction and sentence are affirmed on direct appeal, the circuit court
in which the conviction was obtained shall, within two (2) weeks after
the affirmance, conduct a hearing and enter a written order ap-
pointing counsel."' 45 Likewise, the standards set forth that counsel
must satisfy in order to be appointed under Rule 37 are stated as be-
ing "the exclusive criteria which counsel must satisfy.''t46
Third, changes to the statute as originally introduced as a bill in
the Arkansas Legislature evince an intent by the legislature to create a
mandatory and significant right to counsel for capital defendants in
post-conviction proceedings. 147 Originally introduced into the Arkan-
sas State Senate on February 13, 1997 as Senate Bill 392, the statute's
first provision, under what would become § 16-91-202(a) (1),148 re-
quired that the convicted capital defendant, and not the circuit court,
initiate appointment proceedings. 149 Thus, the introduced version of
the bill stated: "If a person who has received the death penalty intends
to file a post-conviction petition . . . he must file a motion for the
appointment of counsel in that proceeding in the circuit court."150 In
sharp contrast, the enacted bill, as amended by the House on March
5, 1997,151 requires the circuit court in which the conviction was ob-
tained to initiate appointment proceedings within two weeks of the
affirmance of the sentence on direct appeal. 15 2 Further, the amended
version of the same provision of the statute provides that "[t] he court
may decline to appoint counsel for the petitioner only upon a written
finding that the petitioner rejects the appointment of counsel and un-
144. S.B. 392, 81st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1997) (as engrossed) (emphasis
added).
145. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-91-202(a) (1) (A) (i) (Michie 2003) (emphasis added).
146. Id. § 16-91-202(c)(1) (emphasis added).
147. As committee reports and legislative hearing transcripts are unavailable for the
Arkansas Legislature, the best way to evince legislative intent is to examine the language of
the statute itself, as well as changes that were made to the bill by the legislature during the
legislative process.
148. This section of the Arkansas Code is replicated in the Arkansas Rules of Criminal
Procedure at Rule 37.5.
149. Ark. S.B. 392 (as introduced).
150. Id.
151. A report detailing the status of the bill as it was introduced, amended, and en-
acted is available through the ARKANSAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1997 REGULAR SESSION BILLS
AND RESOLUTIONS: VIEW STATUS OF A BILL, at www.arkleg.state.ar.us/1997 (last accessed
Feb. 6, 2004).
152. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-91-202(a) (1) (A) (i) (Michie 2003).
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derstands the legal consequences,"153 whereas the introduced version
was silent on this issue.
154
Further changes to the introduced bill also evince a statutory enti-
tlement protected by the Due Process Clause. The amended versions
of the statute contain a provision that provides that the circuit court
may not appoint an attorney to represent a death-sentenced person in
their post-conviction proceedings if that attorney previously repre-
sented the person at trial or on direct appeal, unless a request is made
to the contrary. 15 5 Even if trial or appellate counsel is requested and
appointed for the defendant's post-conviction proceedings, the provi-
sion requires that the court appoint a second attorney to assist on the
case. 156 Moreover, the provision mandates that if the defendant elects
to proceed pro se, the "waiver of the assistance of counsel shall be
made in open court and on the record." 157 None of these require-
ments were included in the original bill, but again were added as
amendments. 58
These amendments are extremely important in determining
whether Arkansas's provision of competent counsel creates a substan-
tive interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The first amend-
ment to Rule 37 changed the nature of the right to counsel from one
that required the death-sentenced defendant to act affirmatively to a
right that was mandated upon the happening of a certain event.
Rather than being a possible right, the amendment as enacted created
an entitlement. The death-sentenced person is required to do nothing
in order to be entitled to the right to competent counsel: upon the
happening of an event-the affirmance of the death sentence on di-
rect appeal-the entitlement exists and requires a mandated govern-
ment action.
Additionally, the amendments also added in two places what are
essentially waiver of counsel requirements that closely correlate to the
"knowing, voluntary, and intelligent" standard required for the waiver
of constitutional rights. 159 Further, by adding the provision that limits
the ability of trial and appellate counsel to serve as post-conviction
counsel, the legislature seems to have intended to ensure that poten-
153. Id. § 16-91-202(a)(1)(c).
154. See S.B. 392, 81st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1997) (as introduced).
155. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-91-202(a) (2) (A).
156. Id. § 16-91-202(a) (2) (B).
157. Id. § 16-91-202(a) (2) (C).
158. Compare S.B. 392, 81st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1997) (as introduced), with
S.B. 392, 81st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1997) (as engrossed).
159. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
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tial conflicts of interest are minimized for those counsel appointed
under the statute. Due process protections are implicated by both of
these additions that protect against the defendant losing his right to
counsel and protect the defendant from conflicts of interest.
It would be antithetical to assert that Rule 37.5, which creates a
mandatory entitlement to competent counsel for all those under sen-
tence of death and protects this entitlement with due process-like pro-
tections, creates an interest that can be arbitrarily deprived by the
State. The right created under Arkansas law, in fact, is directly analo-
gous to the right to have a jury affix a sentence, as in Hicks. In Hicks a
defendant was specifically entitled under state law upon the happen-
ing of an event-his conviction-to have the jury determine his sen-
tence. 160 This created a protected liberty interest in receiving that
right, and the defendant was deprived of due process when the state
did not have the jury pronounce the defendant's sentence. 161 A forti-
ori, a death-sentenced person is entitled to receive competent counsel
for Rule 37 proceedings under Arkansas law. When he does not re-
ceive the competent counsel that he was entitled to receive under
state law, then that defendant, like Mr. Hicks, has been deprived of
due process of law.
2. Due Process Protections: The Arkansas Supreme Court's
Interpretation of Rule 37 Proceedings
The fact that the Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized that
Due Process protections apply in Rule 37 proceedings for those under
sentence of death strongly supports the conclusion that the State of
Arkansas has created a due process protected entitlement to compe-
tent counsel. The Arkansas Supreme Court has stated, " [W] hile there
is no constitutional right to a post-conviction proceeding, when a
State undertakes to provide collateral relief, due process requires that
the proceeding be fundamentally fair. ' 162 While the Arkansas Su-
preme Court has never recognized that Rule 37.5 requires that coun-
sel be effective, the court has stated that "Rule 37.5 mandates very
specific requirements, including a quality of appointed counsel for
persons pursuing Rule 37.5 relief."' 63 Finally, the Arkansas Supreme
160. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 345 (1980).
161. Id. at 346.
162. Porter v. State, 2 S.W.3d 73, 75 (Ark. 1999) (analyzing whether it is "fundamen-
tally fair" to require a person under sentence of death to abide by Rule 37's filing deadlines
when whether he was currently represented by counsel was legally ambiguous).
163. Jackson v. State, 37 S.W.3d 595, 598 (Ark. 2001).
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Court has also described the purpose of the requirements of Rule 37.5
as being to provide "a comprehensive state-court review of a defendant's
claims.' 1 64 These descriptions illustrate the Arkansas Supreme Court's
acknowledgment of the importance of post-convictions proceedings
to death-sentenced persons as an individual right under state law.
One case is illustrative of the level of protection that Arkansas
courts have provided for the right to counsel provided by Rule 37.
Karl Roberts, currently on Arkansas's death row, was convicted and
decided that he did not wish to challenge his sentence either on ap-
peal or in post-conviction proceedings. 165 Pursuant to Rule 37's re-
quirements, the circuit court held a hearing regarding Mr. Roberts's
waiver of his right to pursue post-conviction relief.166 Mr. Roberts pro-
ceeded pro se.167 During the hearing the judge indicated that he had
reviewed the trial record in its entirety and then advised Mr. Roberts
of the availability of relief and the provision of counsel under Rule
37.168 Mr. Roberts then testified on the record that he did not wish to
have an attorney and that he understood that he was waiving his right
to pursue post-conviction relief.' 69 He stated that he was "intelligently
and knowingly" waiving his rights and was not under the influence of
any medication or substances. 170 The Arkansas Supreme Court re-
viewed the record and found Mr. Roberts's waiver to be sufficient.
171
On its face, the Arkansas courts' treatment of a case like Mr. Rob-
erts's might seem inconsequential. However, the careful manner in
which both the circuit court and state supreme court examined Mr.
Roberts's waiver of his right to pursue post-conviction relief and be
appointed counsel for such proceedings is illustrative of what seems to
be an unstated recognition that the right of a person sentenced to
death to pursue post-conviction relief in Arkansas and receive a com-
petent attorney for such purposes is in fact a fundamental entitlement
under the State's law. This proposition is highly supported by the
mandatory nature of Arkansas's counsel provision and the substantive
protections of the right that are directly provided for in Rule 37. It is
an inescapable conclusion that Arkansas has created an entitlement to
competent counsel protected by the Due Process Clause under Hicks.
164. Echols v. State, 42 S.W.3d 467, 470 (Ark. 2001) (emphasis in original).
165. State v. Roberts, 123 S.W.3d 881, 881 (Ark. 2003) (per curiam).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 882.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
Summer 2004]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
3. An Entitlement to Competent Counsel Is an Entitlement to the
Effective Assistance of Counsel
At least one court has found that a state post-conviction statute
that mandated the appointment of competent counsel only required
that the appointed attorney be "competent" in the sense that the at-
torney meets the criteria mandated by the statute prior to appoint-
ment. 7 2 Under such an analysis, due process protections would only
apply to protect against the deprivation of the right to competent
counsel at the time of appointment. This argument, however, is
flawed for at least three reasons.
First, the Supreme Court has never differentiated "competence"
from "effectiveness." The Court has, in fact, used the terms inter-
changeably and has used "competence" to describe the mandates of
effective assistance of counsel. In McMann v. Richardson,173 the Court
examined the advice and representation that a defendant is entitled
to receive before entering a guilty plea and stated, "[A] defendant's
plea of guilty based on reasonably competent advice is an intelligent
plea," and "defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent
counsel." 174 Later the Court concluded that "a plea of guilty in a state
court is not subject to collateral attack ... unless the defendant was
incompetently advised by his attorney."'1 75 Further, in Strickland v.
Washington,176 wherein the Court established the prevailing standard
for determining constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel
under the Sixth Amendment, 77 the Court specifically used "compe-
tence" in setting forth the level of deficiency in performance that
must be shown to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Court stated that the reviewing court must "determine whether,
in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance."'178 It
must be assumed, therefore, that the Arkansas Legislature, when it
enacted a statute that clearly used the word "competent," did not in-
tend to contradict the established jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court that has long equated competent representation with effective
assistance of counsel.
172. See, e.g., Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
173. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
174. Id. at 770-71.
175. Id. at 772.
176. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
177. See id. at 687.
178. Id. at 690. For the Court's interchanging use of "competence" and "effectiveness,"
see also, for example, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000).
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Second, the right to effective assistance of counsel is the due pro-
cess right that is concomitant with or arises from a right to counsel, let
alone a right to competent counsel. Thus, even if the Arkansas Legis-
lature did not intend competent counsel to mean effective assistance
of counsel, due process requires it. The Supreme Court's cases exam-
ining the provision of counsel for direct appeals, Douglas v. Califor-
nia179 and Evitts v. Lucey,'8 0 grounded the requirement of counsel and
effective assistance of counsel in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Both cases cited to Griffin v.
Illinois,18' wherein the Court held, in striking down a mandatory tran-
script fee, that a state may not grant appellate review in such a way as
to discriminate against convicted defendants because of their pov-
erty. 18 2 Analogizing to Griffin, the Court in Douglas found that the de-
nial of counsel to an indigent defendant for a direct appeal violated
the Fourteenth Amendment, stating that "[t]he indigent, where the
record is unclear or the errors hidden, has only the right to a mean-
ingless ritual.' 8 3 In Evitts, the Court found that "if a State has created
appellate courts as 'an integral part of the ... system for finally adjudi-
cating the guilt or innocence of a defendant,' the procedures used in
deciding appeals must comport with the demands of the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution."'1 4 The Court went
on to hold in Evitts that "the promise of Douglas that a criminal defen-
dant has a right to counsel on appeal . . .would be a futile gesture
unless it comprehended the right to the effective assistance of coun-
sel." 85 Likewise, Arkansas's promise that a death-sentenced person
has a right to a competent attorney for Rule 37 proceedings would be
a futile gesture unless, consistent with the dictates of the Due Process
Clause, such counsel in fact renders effective assistance.
Finally, both state and federal courts have recognized that a state
statute that entitles a defendant to counsel, even though such a right
to counsel does not arise under the Sixth Amendment, gives rise to a
concomitant right to the effective assistance of counsel. These courts
have reached such a conclusion in most cases rather summarily, find-
ing that a statutory right to counsel obviously and necessarily implies a
179. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
180. 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
181. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
182. Id. at 18 (finding unconstitutional an Illinois law that required the purchase of a
transcript for a full appellate review).
183. Douglas, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).
184. Evitts, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985) (omissions in original) (citations omitted).
185. Id. at 397.
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concomitant right that such counsel be effective. The Iowa Supreme
Court has stated that "the statutory grant of a post-conviction appli-
cant's right to court-appointed counsel necessarily implies that that
counsel be effective. . . .It would seem to be an empty gesture to
provide counsel without any implied requirement of effectiveness." 18 6
Likewise, the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that "[i] t would be
absurd to have the right to appointed counsel who is not required to
be competent," 18 7 and an Illinois Appellate Court has concluded that
"the legislature could not have intended to provide an individual sub-
ject to involuntary commitment with the right to counsel and to per-
mit that counsel to be prejudicially ineffective."'1 88 The Supreme
Courts of Nevada, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota have all reached
the exact same conclusion: a statutory right to counsel necessarily im-
plies a concomitant right to the effective assistance of counsel. 189
For these reasons, the State of Arkansas's provision of competent
counsel in post-conviction proceedings to persons under sentence of
death creates an entitlement under state law to not just counsel for
such proceedings, but rather to the effective assistance of counsel dur-
ing post-conviction proceedings. A person who fails to receive such
assistance has been deprived of their entitlement granted by state law.
Under Hicks, this person has not only been deprived of a state right to
effective assistance of counsel-they have been deprived of the due
process of law protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. Enforcing the Entitlement to Competent Counsel in Rule 37
Proceedings
A death-sentenced person who has been deprived of his due pro-
cess-protected right to competent counsel in his Rule 37 proceedings
may enforce this right in two possible forums: state court or federal
court. However, because the Arkansas Supreme Court's jurisprudence
has limited the availability of secondary Rule 37 proceedings as well as
186. Patchette v. State, 374 N.W.2d 397, 398-99 (Iowa 1985); see also Dunbar v. State,
515 N.W.2d 12 (Iowa 1994).
187. Lozada v. Warden, 613 A.2d 818, 821-22 (Conn. 1992); see also lovieno v. Comm'r
of Correction, 699 A.3d 1003 (Conn. 1997).
188. In re Carmody, 653 N.E.2d 977, 983-84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
189. See Commonwealth v. Albert, 561 A.2d 736 (Pa. 1989); McKague v. Whitley, 912
P.2d 255, 258 n.5 (Nev. 1996); Crump v. Warden, 934 P.2d 247, 248 (Nev. 1997);Jackson v.
Weber, 637 N.W.2d 19 (S.D. 2000); Krebs v. Weber, 608 N.W.2d 322 (S.D. 2000); see also
Cullins v. Crouse, 348 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1965); United States v. Wren, 682 F. Supp. 1237
(S.D. Ga. 1988). But see In re Goff, 250 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 2001); Martinez v. Johnson,
255 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001); Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
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other forms of collateral relief, federal habeas proceedings present
the most likely forum in which a death-sentenced person can enforce
their due-process right to competent post-conviction counsel.
1. Bringing the Claim in Arkansas Courts
A defendant may attempt to assert in an Arkansas state court that
he has been denied due process of law under Hicks because he has
received ineffective assistance of Rule 37 counsel. Although the Ar-
kansas courts have never explicitly held that there is no right to re-
dress ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel within its courts,
current jurisprudence provides some doubt as to whether Arkansas
courts have an available forum in which to assert this claim. Asserting
such a claim would require a petitioner to file a second Rule 37 peti-
tion. However, the Arkansas Supreme Court has explicitly held that
unless a Rule 37 petition is dismissed without prejudice to re-file, a
petitioner is entitled to file only one Rule 37 petition. 190 In one recent
case, however, Robbins v. State,191 the Arkansas Supreme Court re-
opened the case of a death-sentenced person whose sentence had
been affirmed in Rule 37 proceedings. 92 The supreme court in Rob-
bins was explicit that it was re-opening the case because of the "unique
circumstances" of the petitioner's case, but also stated that its decision
to re-open the case was a result of the fact that it was a death-sentence
case and that "it is now incumbent on the states to do a comprehen-
sive state-court review of all death cases."' 193 The Robbins decision is
clearly contrary to the otherwise prevailing rule that a defendant is
entitled to one Rule 37 hearing. Therefore, this leaves open the ques-
tion of the availability of Rule 37 as a forum for relief based on a claim
of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as a due process
denial.
If death-sentenced persons are not entitled to a second Rule 37
hearing, it is likely that no other state forum is available in which to
raise claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as a
deprivation of due process under Hicks.194 Allegations of constitu-
190. See Williams v. State, 619 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Ark. 1981).
191. 114 S.W.3d 217 (Ark. 2003).
192. Id. at 222.
193. Id. at 223. The unique circumstances cited by the court in Robbins included the
fact that the petitioner's jury verdict form was likely deficient under a prior holding of the
Arkansas Supreme Court, an error missed in petitioner's first Rule 37 proceeding. See id. at
221.
194. If Arkansas, in fact, provides no state forum in which to address defendants's
claims that they have been denied their due-process protected rights to competent counsel
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tional error and ineffective assistance of counsel have been restricted
by the Arkansas Supreme Court to direct appeals and post-conviction
petitions only. They may not be raised in other possible claims, such
as in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or a writ of error coram
nobis.195 Standard tort remedies, finally, would be insufficient to en-
force these claims because, generally, such remedies merely provide
financial relief.
2. Bringing the Claim in Federal Court
A claim that a defendant under sentence of death in Arkansas has
been deprived of his due process interest in competent counsel for his
Rule 37 hearing would be cognizable in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings. Such a claim would be based on not merely a violation of
state law, but rather on a Fourteenth Amendment due process viola-
tion, as the Supreme Court in Hicks stressed. 196 To assert a claim for
federal habeas corpus relief, a defendant must assert that he is in cus-
tody of the state in violation of the Constitution of the United
States. 197 A due process violation under Hicks would meet this require-
ment. The defendant would assert that the state's failure to afford him
his right under state law to competent counsel violated his substantive
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. This
would be a claim that attacks the constitutional validity of the process
that results in the ultimate imposition of the death sentence and the
legality of the defendant's confinement. Additionally, to state a claim
for habeas corpus relief a defendant must also show that he has ex-
hausted all available state remedies or that state remedies are unavaila-
ble to him.198 Thus, a death-sentenced person in Arkansas would
likely have to attempt to exhaust state remedies, such as attempting to
under Hicks, this in and of itself may be a violation of procedural due process because the
State would be denying death-sentenced persons the minimal procedural protections man-
dated by the Due Process Clause for the deprivation of a protected interest. See, e.g., Hewitt
v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71 (1983); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
195. See Renshaw v. Norris, 989 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Ark. 1999); Williams v. Langston, 688
S.W.2d 285, 286 (Ark. 1985).
196. The federal habeas corpus statute contains a provision stating that claims of inef-
fective assistance of state post-conviction counsel are not grounds for relief in federal
habeas corpus proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2000). However, the claim for relief
discussed in this Comment would not be such a claim-rather, the claim would be, under
Hicks, a claim for relief on the basis of a due process violation, that the defendant has failed
to receive his state statutory entitlement to competent counsel.
197. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000).
198. See id. § 2254(b)(1).
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file a second Rule 37 petition or showing that doing so would be im-
possible, prior to asserting a claim for relief in habeas corpus.
A defendant asserting such a claim in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings would be asserting that the State of Arkansas's failure to pro-
vide the defendant with the competent counsel that he was entitled to
receive under the State's statute constituted a deprivation of the de-
fendant's liberty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. The defendant would be asking the federal court in a
habeas corpus proceeding to grant the same relief that Mr. Hicks was
granted by the Supreme Court in Hicks-the opportunity for the de-
fendant to receive the competent counsel and the effective assistance
of counsel that he was entitled to receive under Arkansas law.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's refusal thus far to extend the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel to death-sentenced persons in post-conviction
proceedings forecloses claims of ineffective assistance of counsel dur-
ing post-conviction reviews, such as in Rule 37 proceedings in Arkan-
sas. However, the denial of a defendant's state statutory right to
competent post-conviction counsel is not a Sixth Amendment claim; it
is a due process claim. The State of Arkansas has by legislative choice
granted its capital defendants an entitlement to competent counsel
for Rule 37 proceedings. It is antithetical to argue that Rule 37, a self-
described system of comprehensive review for which "competent
counsel" is appointed and due process protections apply, does not en-
title a death-sentenced person in Arkansas to effective assistance of
counsel in post-conviction proceedings. The mandatory provision of
competent counsel to persons under sentence of death in Arkansas
would be of no value, both to the represented and to the state system
of post-conviction appeals, if such a right may be guaranteed to all
whom are under sentence of death and then arbitrarily abrogated by
the State's failure to provide that which it has promised.
When the State of Arkansas fails to provide a death-sentenced
person with the competent counsel that it has promised under state
law, it has deprived that person of a protected liberty interest under
the Supreme Court holding in Hicks. In doing so, the State has of-
fended the mandate of due process secured by the United States Con-
stitution. For those currently under sentence of death, such as Ledell
Lee and Timothy Kemp, these commands of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment are of fundamental importance in the future: if they are not
enforced, Mr. Lee and Mr. Kemp may lose forever the ability to assert
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possibly meritorious claims for relief from their death sentences. The
cases of those who have already been executed after having received
less than effective representation in post-conviction proceedings, such
as Mr. Noel, show that the commands of the Due Process Clause have
proven hollow in Arkansas's Rule 37 proceedings. The State of Arkan-
sas simply cannot, consistent with the dictates of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, grant those under sentence of
death an unequivocal entitlement to competent counsel and then ut-
terly fail to meet this promise. Borrowing from the Supreme Court's
own words in Hicks, "[s]uch an arbitrary disregard of the [defen-
dant's] right to liberty is a denial of due process of law."199 For death-
sentenced persons in Arkansas this denial of due process is not just
about abstract liberty-rather, it is inextricably related to whether or
not the State of Arkansas may deprive a person of a right that it has
made of fundamental importance in its system of determining the
question of who gets to live and who is forced to die.
199. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980).
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